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Are the predictions of tax competition theory wrong? Recent empirical results on capital taxa-
tion suggest that this might be the case. While tax competition literature predicts that capital 
taxes decrease with increasing globalisation, empirical studies on various data find contradict-
ing evidence. By using different data and additional elements of economic theory, this paper 
aims to challenge the empirical contributions. For a panel of 14 OECD countries and the pe-
riod 1967-96, we find that globalisation has indeed a negative and significant impact on cor-
porate taxes. Furthermore, globalisation tends to raise labour taxes and social expenditures. 
As a consequence, the so-called “efficiency” and “compensation” hypotheses of globalisation 
are not competing, they both appear to apply at the same time: efficiency has an impact on the 
tax-mix whereas compensation is provided through increased social expenditures.  
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1 Introduction 
Following the basic results of tax competition literature, capital taxation is negatively and 
labour taxation is positively related to the degree of international capital mobility. Further-
more, theory suggests that larger countries levy higher tax rates than smaller countries be-
cause the erosion of their tax base is smaller in per capita terms (cf. Bucovetsky 1991 and 
Wilson 1991). In full accordance with microeconomic principles, these predictions are de-
rived from general equilibrium models. It is thus very surprising that most of recent empirical 
studies obtain almost reverse results. For instance, in a panel regression of 15 OECD coun-
tries for the period 1976–90, Garrett (1995) finds that a rising exposure to international trade, 
which is used as a proxy for financial liberalisation, leads to an increase in capital taxation. 
Referring to cross-country studies of economic growth, Quinn  (1997) considers a broader 
range of 64 countries with annual data averaged over the years 1974–89. He concludes that 
corporate taxation is positively associated with financial liberalisation under a wide variety of 
different model specifications. These findings are supported by Swank (1998). In a panel re-
gression for 17 industrialised countries (mainly OECD countries) for the period 1966–93, he 
finds that three different measures of capital mobility are positively related to the proxy of 
corporate taxation.  
However, a closer look at these empirical results reveals problems and possible defi-
ciencies. For instance, the creation of a proxy for the dependent variable – the tax policy – is a 
major problem. Proxies commonly used in cross-country studies are the revenues of corporate 
taxation as a percentage of the GDP. It can be shown that this method is inadequate in several 
respects. In addition, it seems that the specifications of the estimated equations can be en-
riched with the help of economic theory. 
By using effective average capital and labour tax-rates, Rodrik (1997) avoids the data 
problem. In a panel approach of 19 OECD countries for the period 1965–91, he finds that a 
proxy for openness has a significantly negative effect on capital taxes and a significantly posi-
tive effect on labour taxes. However, his results are not robust when one adds a qualitative 
dummy variable for international exchange rate restrictions and an interaction term of this 
dummy with the proxy of openness. The change in capital taxation is one of the main features 
in the more general discussion on the consequences of globalisation for the nation state. In 
their broad survey, Schulze and Ursprung (1999) consider the different links between the re-
duction in international arbitrage costs and fiscal policy. Their contribution covers topics such 
as the size of the public sector, the structure of public expenditures, the structure of taxes and  2
the scope of redistribution policies. The survey comments on the reviewed literature as fol-
lows: “…many of these studies find no negative relationship between globalisation and the 
nation’s ability to conduct independent fiscal policies.”
1 The authors also suggest that the dif-
ferent hypotheses on the effects of globalisation are not mutually exclusive. They argue that 
some effects apply especially to tax policy, which must be distinguished from the effects on 
government expenditures. 
According to this assessment, the plan of this paper is to concentrate on the following is-
sues. First, we show that the proxy variables for corporate taxation used by Garrett (1995) and 
Quinn (1997) both have conceptional difficulties and are responsible for certain counterintui-
tive results. Consequently, we use effective average tax rates on corporate capital with the 
methodology proposed in the seminal paper of Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994). In this way, 
government tax policy seems to be much better depicted as we additionally control for tax 
base effects. Furthermore, we distinguish precisely between the measure of globalisation and 
country-size. Second, we explicitly take into account the result of tax competition literature 
concerning labour taxation and the impact of country-size on the government tax policy. To 
show the theoretical foundation, we rely on a small theoretical model of international tax 
competition. Third, as in reality, tax policy depends on a number of additional elements, we 
enlarge the simple tax competition model with the issues of dynamics, political preferences 
and uncertainty. Furthermore, we include several sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of 
the estimated coefficients. We control for different macroeconomic variables, which should 
have an impact according to theory. Fourth, we use panel data for 14 OECD countries with 
annual frequency, covering the period from 1967 to 1996. To do so, we have collected and 
constructed data for Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Fifth, we expand our analysis of capital taxation on labour taxation and social expenditures. 
The focus of this paper is to determine government tax-policy behaviour. Before we 
start with the econometric analyses, we describe which variables are important from a theo-
retical view. The main issue is capital taxation. As taxation of labour and social expenditures 
are linked to this topic through the government’s budget constraint, further empirical results 
for these issues are added. The empirical results of the paper exhibit that the theoretical pre-
diction of a negative impact of international capital mobility on corporate taxation can indeed 
be found in the data, once the conceptual and theoretical problems of existing studies are ad-
dressed. Furthermore, as theoretical models of tax competition predict, labour taxation is posi-
                                                 
1   Schulze and Ursprung (1999, page 345).  3
tively related to increasing globalisation. Finally, we observe that government social expendi-
ture responds positively to increasing globalisation as well. Thus, there is evidence of differ-
ent hypotheses on the effects of globalisation at the same time. On the one hand, we observe a 
change in the tax-mix from the rather elastic corporate tax-base to the rather inelastic labour 
tax-base, which is a result of tax competition. On the other hand, we find increasing social 
expenditures, which seems to show the governments’ aim to compensate for increasing risk.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic theo-
retical tax competition model. In addition, it enlarges the simple approach with further ele-
ments, which are important for current tax policy. In section 3, the data are described. In par-
ticular, the measurement of globalisation and capital taxation is depicted in detail. Section 4 
contains the empirical results regarding the impact of globalisation on corporate taxes, labour 
taxes and social expenditures. Section 5 concludes. 
2  Effects of Globalisation on Fiscal Policy 
Globalisation has distinct effects on the tax structure and on government expenditures. With a 
rising degree of international integration, national governments lose parts of their monopoly 
power of fiscal policy. They increasingly find themselves in a situation of strategic interaction 
with their foreign counterparts. Furthermore, due to globalisation, uncertainty and structural 
adjustments within an economy increase, which may affect fiscal policy additionally. In po-
litical science literature, the effects of globalisation on fiscal policy are explained either by the 
so-called “efficiency hypothesis” or by the “compensation hypothesis”. The efficiency hy-
pothesis argues that governments compete for mobile factors and goods. As a consequence, it 
predicts an erosion of the nation state. On the other hand, the compensation hypothesis sug-
gests that governments expand their welfare state to insure their citizens against the increased 
economic risk generated by globalisation (cf. Garrett and Mitchell 1998).  
In section 2.1, we will first describe the efficiency view in more detail by means of the 
economic theory on international tax competition. To do so, we sketch the assumptions and 
results of a simple model. In section 2.2, we then discuss some fundamental assumptions of 
this model and show which variables – explaining government tax policy behaviour – should 
be additionally incorporated in the empirical analyses. Incorporating these new variables in 
our analysis, we are able to test the compensation view as well.   4
2.1  The Theoretical Model 
In this section, we outline some basic results of the theory on international tax competition in 
an informal way.
2 To understand this theory and to demonstrate the underlying assumptions, 
we start by sketching a basic model.
3 Tax competition is just one – although important – shap-
ing of the efficiency view. However, the basic mechanism can easily be applied to other as-
pects of government competition which may take place, for instance, in the form of environ-
mental or labour-market (de)regulation and of the provision of productive public goods. 
Tax competition literature focuses on the factor capital, as it is considered to be par-
ticularly mobile in the international context. Of course, national governments may also com-
pete for mobile labour or consumers. However, whether tax competition arises depends not 
only on the removal of mobility restrictions on factors or consumers but also on the actual 
mobility of factors and of the prevailing tax system. For instance, the actual mobility of labour 
within the EU is low in spite of the realisation of the Common Market in 1992 which guaran-
tees the free movement of EU citizens as well as the freedom of establishment (see 
Leiner 1998). And, although consumer goods are very mobile within the EU, we can exclude 
consumption tax competition because of the prevailing destination principle.
4 
Consider a static model with many identical countries. Each country consists of a large 
number of identical households, firms and a government. Within each country, perfectly com-
petitive firms produce a single homogenous output good by using capital and labour. The out-
put good is sold to domestic households as a consumption good and to the domestic govern-
ment, which can transform it into a public good. Households own fixed endowments of capi-
tal and supply the immobile factor labour inelastically. Capital is assumed to be internation-
ally mobile; thus households are free to invest their capital wherever they want. Assuming 
rational behaviour, capital moves across borders to seek the highest net-of-tax return. House-
holds finance the consumption good with the wage and capital income, which is received 
from invested capital and supplied labour. The well-behaved utility function of the identical 
households depends positively with decreasing marginal utility on the private consumption 
good and the domestic public good. Each country’s public good is supplied by the domestic 
                                                 
2   For an excellent survey, see Wilson (1999). 
3   The model described in the following is based on Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). 
4   Under the destination principle exports are not taxed by the exporting country but by the importing coun-
try. The origin-based taxation system is applied for cross-border shopping only. Since the share of cross-
border shopping of total trade is negligible, we do not examine tax competition in the field of consump-
tion.   5
government and solely financed by a capital tax according to the source principle. Thus, only 
the capital employed in the domestic country can be taxed. 
The government is assumed to behave in an efficient manner, hence it does not overtax 
or waste any revenue. The government chooses the capital income tax rate and hence deter-
mines the provision of the public good by maximizing household utility, subject to its budget 
constraint  
G = τ ⋅ K, (1) 
with G being the supply of the public good, τ  the proportional capital tax and K the domestic 
capital stock. In the optimum, the government chooses the tax rate τ  such that social marginal 
benefits from the public good 
soc MB  equal social marginal costs of tax raising  
soc MC : 
soc soc MC MB = . (2) 
To determine the components of 
soc MC , we totally differentiate (1) to obtain 
dG = dτ ⋅ K +τ ⋅dK. (3) 
The first term on the rhs of (3) corresponds to the marginal individual cost of taxation 
priv MC . 
It arises due to decreased after-tax income and thus lower private consumption possibilities. 
The second term on the rhs of (3) describes the tax-base effect of capital taxation. For a closed 
and static economy, this effect is absent (dK = 0). Hence, general optimality condition (2) 
results in the following optimum equation – known as the Samuelson rule: 
priv soc MC MB = ,  with  
opt τ τ =   and  
opt G G = . (4) 
This is a first-best result. It is assumed that the government can choose a capital income 
tax τ
opt, which allows it to provide the optimal amount of the public good 
opt G . However, if 
we now allow for international capital mobility, there is a capital outflow (dK ≠ 0) as a con-
sequence of an increase in τ . The marginal costs of the outflow are given as second term on 
the rhs of (3). Thus the marginal social cost of taxation consists of the marginal individual 
costs 
priv MC  and the marginal costs of capital outflow 
. outfl MC  caused by capital taxation. 
Thus for the open economy, the optimality condition (2) results in the following equation – 
known as the modified Samuelson rule: 
. outfl priv soc MC MC MB + = ,  with  
opt τ τ <   and  
opt G G < . (5)  6
Since the marginal social costs of taxation are higher for an open economy than for a closed 
economy, the marginal social benefits of providing the public good must be higher as well. To 
fulfil the second-best optimality condition, the capital income-tax rate and hence the supply of 
the public good are at an inefficiently low level. This is true although the government still acts 
optimally from a national point of view and the solution is still first best from the country’s 
perspective. The reason for this result is that a rise in a given country’s tax rate creates a posi-
tive fiscal externality. For example, for a given world capital stock, a rise in the domestic 
capital tax causes capital outflows and thus increases the capital tax base in all other coun-
tries. Since governments do not take this effect into account, the provision of the public good 
is inefficiently low. 
The basic tax competition model has been extended in several ways. So far we as-
sumed identical and atomistic countries. Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) analyse the 
case where two countries of different size compete for internationally mobile capital. They 
show that the smaller of the two countries faces the more elastic tax base and will choose the 
lower capital tax rate in equilibrium. The larger country levies a higher tax rate because the 
erosion of its tax base is smaller in per capita terms.  
Allowing, additionally, for a labour tax, a welfare-maximising government of a small 
open economy should finance the provision of the public good solely with this tax. This result 
is obvious when labour supply is fixed. By assuming internationally immobile labour and 
neglecting an endogenous labour-leisure decision, the labour tax possesses the properties of a 
lump-sum tax. However, even if the labour tax distorts the labour-leisure decision, Bucovet-
sky and Wilson (1991) show that the revenue needs should be met by taxing labour income 
only. This result is valid for small open economies. The intuition is that capital supply is infi-
nitely elastic, whereas the labour supply elasticity is finite. However, the larger the country is, 
the lower the elasticity of capital supply becomes. Hence, countries with significant influence 
on capital supply will tax both labour and capital income.  
Given these basic results of the tax competition literature, we have three testable hy-
potheses:  
•= At a given time, the more integrated a country is in the world capital market, the lower 
capital taxation is. 
•= At a given time, the more integrated a country is in the world capital market, the 
higher labour taxation compared to capital taxation is. 
•= Given a certain degree of international integration, smaller countries have lower capi-
tal tax rates than larger countries.  7
Before indicating additional variables which may determine government tax policy, 
we briefly discuss the applicability of the tax competition model to the real world. Most 
European countries tax de jure international capital streams according to the residence princi-
ple. Thus one could argue that the results of the above-described model are not relevant as the 
residence principle neutralises the effects of international differences in tax rates regarding the 
decision where to invest internationally mobile capital. However, due to limited information 
flows between banks and fiscal authorities, administrative problems and the lack of interna-
tional treaties, the residence principle is not enforceable. Therefore, most experts agree that 
the present taxation of corporate profits follows de facto closely the source principle, see e.g. 
Tanzi and Bovenberg (1990), Keen (1993) and Sørensen (1995).  
2.2  Additional Elements of Government Behaviour 
The model of section 2.1 is embedded in a static environment. However, it seems reasonable 
to postulate that the economic development of an economy determines the government’s tax-
policy behaviour as well. To show this as simply as possible, assume a small open economy 
with capital taxation to take the form of a capital income tax with rate τ *, so that the gov-
ernment budget constraint becomes: 
K K A r G ⋅ ⋅ = ) , ( * τ  (6) 
with r denoting the interest rate and A being the exogenous level of technical knowledge. Ac-
cording to microeconomic theory, technical progress increases the marginal product of capital 
and thus the interest rate, while a higher capital input has the opposite effect. However, for a 
small country, r is simply the world interest rate, i.e. it is given at any moment in time. There-
fore, any increase in A does not increase the interest rate in the home economy, but causes an 
immediate capital inflow, which can be taxed to balance the domestic budget. Totally differ-
entiating (6) gives: 
) * * * (
. infl. outfl dK dK K d r dG ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ = τ τ τ  (7) 
In (7), the second term on the rhs corresponds to the capital outflow given in (3). The last 
term is capital inflow 
infl. dK  as a consequence of exogenous technical progress. To be precise, 
it captures the technical progress that exceeds worldwide progress. (7) says that the tax rate on 
capital income is lower when capital productivity ceteris paribus increases. That is, in this 
case, a lower tax rate suffices to balance the budget. As a consequence of (7), we control for 
the economic growth rate in the econometric analysis below.   8
In the optimum, the marginal benefit (MB) of an increase of G is still assumed to equal 
marginal costs (MC) of taxation, see equation (2). In the simple approach above, MB was de-
termined by the household’s utility function only. But assuming a benevolent dictator, maxi-
mising the welfare of the representative household neglects the political economy of tax pol-
icy. It is problematic in at least three respects. First, it does not take into account the fact that 
the government is no unit actor. The “government” is rather a heterogeneous group of con-
flicting politicians and parties in cabinet and legislative. Furthermore, pure welfare maximis-
ing does not consider the direct incentives for the government. In the first place, governments 
and political parties strive for maximise their re-election changes. Therefore, political deci-
sions might not always be welfare-maximising. Finally, government behaviour may be deter-
mined by ideological preferences, as Cusack (1997) shows empirically. Following the partisan 
politics models, the government has a certain degree of freedom during the elected period to 
achieve its goals. For instance, it is supposed that leftist governments favour redistribution 
and thus prefer a higher level of government expenditures while conservative governments 
favour the untrammelled working of the market system and hence reduce government spend-
ing. As a consequence, to determine MB, preferences of the government also have to be con-
sidered. This will be done by a variable for the political centre of gravity on a right-left-scale. 
In the model explained above – as often in economic theory – we determine equilibrium 
conditions and neglect uncertainty. However, in the case of globalisation and the nation state, 
adjustment costs and uncertainty are further issues. To consider adjustment costs, we addi-
tionally consider a partial adjustment specification of the underlying tax competition model in 
our econometric analyses. More precisely, the tax of period t is then a weighted average of the 
equilibrium value and the past tax rate. Regarding uncertainty, we include a variable for firm 
profitability. This aims to capture the impact of (unexpected) high or low profits on govern-
ments' tax decisions. Concerning public expenditures, uncertainty also plays an important 
role. Increasing globalisation is accompanied by many structural adjustments in the national 
economy. For instance, the labour intensity in production and the required labour qualification 
may change due to increasing globalisation. Due to natural and institutional hindrances, it is 
thus likely that the labour market is (additionally) distorted during the adaptation process 
caused by increasing globalisation. More generally, it is argued that globalisation causes ris-
ing economic risk for households and firms. The national government can insure citizens 
against this risk by means of certain welfare programs. That is the view of the compensation 
hypothesis. It suggests that governments will expand their welfare programs to insure citizens 
against the economic risk generated by market integration. It emphasises the political incen- 9
tives for governments to ameliorate the short-term distortions by market integration, as for 
instance in the labour market in the form of unemployment. Cameron (1978) empirically sup-
ports the compensation view. He finds a positive relation between market integration and the 
welfare state. Furthermore, the compensation hypothesis suggests that social welfare pro-
grams might be advantageous to make citizens support increasing globalisation (see e.g. Rug-
gie 1983). To incorporate this issue, we present a separate estimation for social expenditures 
in our study.  
Summarising these enlargements of the simple theory and following the compensation 
view, we add the following hypotheses: 
•= At a given time, the higher the growth rate of a country, the lower the capital taxation.  
•= At a given time, the more conservative the government, the lower capital and labour 
taxes. 
•= The higher the country’s integration in the world capital market is, the larger the gov-
ernments’ (social) expenditures become.  
3 The  Data 
In this section we describe the data used for the econometric analyses and show trends of im-
portant variables. We concentrate on the variables for globalisation and capital taxation and 
relegate the description of the other variables to the appendix on page 22. 
3.1 Measuring  Globalisation 
There is little doubt that international integration of national economies increased substan-
tially in the considered period, i.e. from 1967 to 1996. As the degree of international capital 
mobility is difficult to measure, let us regard several different qualitative and quantitative 
variables as a proxy of international capital market integration more closely. Independent of 
the used variables, unweighted average data all show an increasing international integration.  
Figure 1 shows two variables used in the literature for measuring international (capi-
tal) market integration. It is seen that the quantitative trade variable openness1, measured as 
the sum of exports and imports in goods and services as a proportion of GDP, scaled on the 
left-hand score, grew from 46 per cent in the period 67/71 to 60 per cent in the period 92/96. 
The variable openness2, scaled on the right-hand side, is a qualitative index, ranging from 
most closed (0) to most open (14). This variable, rising from 10 in the period 67/91 to 13 in 
the period 92/96, is constructed by analysing inward and outward capital and current account 
restrictions and by regarding international legal agreements that constrain a nation’s ability to  10
restrict exchange and capital flows.
5 When using trade variables openness1 or openness2 as 
measure of capital market integration, we assume that economies which are more exposed to 
trade tend to be economies with higher capital mobility. 
Figure 1: Market integration in goods and services, quantitative and qualitative, 
based on five-year unweighted averages from fourteen OECD countries 
However, it should be noted that smaller countries naturally have higher trade shares 
than larger countries. This becomes intuitive when we think of very small countries like Lux-
emburg, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Singapore etc. The economic reason behind this fact is 
economies of scale, which lead to a higher degree of specialisation in smaller regional enti-
ties. With all consumers being eager to buy the whole range of products on world markets, a 
small country must then have higher trade shares. Given this fact, smaller countries tend to 
have higher values of the globalisation proxy openness1 than larger countries. We correct for 
this bias by first performing a panel regression with openness1 as endogenous variable and 
size as exogenous variable. Only the residuals from the average trend out of this regression 
are then regarded as indicators of real openness of an economy.
6 By doing so, we eliminate 
the size effect of our globalisation proxy openness1. The new variable is called open.  
Figure 2 shows average values for the years 1992–96 of the variable openness1 and 
the variable open for every country. The unweighted average for all countries of openness1 
and open is 0.603 and 0, respectively. The figure indicates the influence of a country’s size on 
its openness. This becomes clear when we regard Sweden (S), for instance. It is seen that with 
a value of 0.67, the variable openness1 indicates Sweden to be an above-average open coun-
                                                 
5   For a more detailed description of this qualitative index, see Quinn (1997). 



























































































































try. However, eliminating the influence of the size, it can be seen that Sweden is actually a 
rather closed economy. The value of open is -0.073, i.e. below the average of all the countries. 
The opposite applies to the United States. This country has relatively low values for open-
ness1, but nevertheless, it is an open economy according to open. By eliminating the influence 
of size in openness1, we are able to distinguish precisely between the actual degree of 
globalisation and the size of a country. This distinction is import to check the correctness of 
the results of the theoretical tax competition literature. 
Figure 2: Elimination of size-effects in openness1 
In the following, we discuss two alternative globalisation proxies. Figure 3 shows in-
vestment abroad as a percentage of GDP (variable diinvest) on the left-hand scale and a meas-
ure of capital account regulation, which is controlled by the respective country (variable capi-
tal) on right-hand scale. Capital is a qualitative index; its values range between 0 and 4 – 0 for 
strong and 4 for no capital payment restrictions.
7 The figure shows average values for all 
countries. We can see that investment abroad as a percentage of GDP increased from 0.66% 
in the period 67/71 to more than 2% in the period 92/96; however, the main rise took place 
between the periods 82/86 and 87/92. In contrast, the qualitative measure capital shows that 
the countries constantly abolished their capital payment restrictions during the whole time of 
observation. 
For the following estimations, we focus on the globalisation measure open. This variable 
is based on generally accepted trade measures and corrected for the bias arising from size ef-
fects. We also used the other globalisation measures, but the results were less satisfying and 
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are not reported here. Concerning the variable diinvest, it should be noted that an adequate 
measure of openness should refer to the potential to move capital rather than the actual flows 
of direct investments abroad. For instance, in equilibrium no foreign direct investments will 
take place although the capital market may be fully integrated. 
Figure 3: Capital market integration quantitative (left-hand scale) and qualitative (right-hand scale); 
 unweighted averages from fourteen OECD countries. 
3.2 Capital  taxation 
The selection of a proxy for the tax policy is crucial for the results. Using the most readily 
available measure, the statutory tax rates, is unsatisfactory for the following reason. The ef-
fective tax burden is determined not only by the statutory tax rate but also by the size of the 
tax base, which is influenced by different national complex tax-credits, tax-exemptions and 
tax-deductions.  
For these reasons, proxies commonly used in cross-country studies are corporate tax 
revenues as a percentage of GDP, as a percentage of individual taxation or as a percentage of 
total taxation (see for instance Garrett 1995 and Quinn 1997). However, the mentioned prox-
ies possess several insufficiencies as will be shown in the following: (i) The proxy corporate 
tax revenues as a percentage of GDP is no strategic variable of the government. The govern-
ment can determine the tax burden by the corporate tax rate and the tax base but not the GDP. 
(ii) The average surplus of corporate enterprises – which can be seen as the actual tax base of 
corporate taxation – as a percentage of GDP of the investigated countries has risen from 8.21 
per cent in 1980 to 9.82 per cent in 1996. This corresponds to a rise of 19.63 per cent. Since 
































































































































between the first corporate tax proxy and the proxy of capital market integration found by 
Garrett (1995) and Quinn (1997) may be caused solely by a rise in the corporate tax base. 
(iii) Another shortcoming becomes evident when we observe the strategic behaviour of multi-
national firms. These firms have the change to reduce their tax burden by shifting their sur-
plus by transfer prices to a low-tax country. Imagine, for instance, that multinational firms 
shifted their surplus by transfer prices to Luxembourg because of a low corporate taxation. 
The proxy corporate taxation as a percentage of individual taxation would increase, thus char-
acterising Luxembourg incorrectly as a high-tax country although the opposite would be cor-
rect. To avoid these problems, we use effective average tax rates calculated with the method-
ology proposed in the seminal paper of Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994). These tax rates are 
calculated by dividing total tax revenue from consumption, labour and capital taxation by the 
pre-tax consumption expenditure and pre-tax income of the respective factor. The most 
important tax rate for our analysis, the effective average corporate tax rate, is a subset of the 
effective average capital tax.  
Figure 4: Measures of corporate taxation. 
Figure 4 shows the contrasting developments of corporate taxation as a percentage of 
GDP and the effective average corporate tax rate. The unweighted effective corporate tax rate 
(corptax) for all countries sharply increases in the late sixties and early seventies to more than 








































































































porate tax revenues as a percentage of GDP (corgar), used by Garrett (1995) and Quinn 
(1997), shows a totally different development. 
There is a special reason for focusing on corporate taxation rather than on capital taxa-
tion. The problem with effective capital tax rates is that they incorporate taxes on immovable 
properties, which possess a rather inelastic tax base. Because of this immobility, these tax 
rates tend to rise due to globalisation, like the taxes on labour. Furthermore, since corporate 
capital quite often belongs to multinational firms, it seems to be much more mobile than the 
capital of private households and small enterprises and thus to fulfil better the assumptions of 
the tax competition model. 
4  Evidence from Panel Data for OECD Countries  
We collected annual data from 1967 to 1996 for 14 OECD countries. For estimation, we used 
the GLS-random-effects estimator for cross-sectional time-series regression models of the 
STATA software package. As an alternative, we evaluated a feasible generalised least squares 
procedure which allows estimation in the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels or 
cross-sectional correlation and/or heteroscedasticity across panels. However, the latter method 
produced very similar results to the former so that the results of the GLS-random-effects es-
timator are representative.
8 To show evidence for the hypotheses of the theoretical approach, 
the following procedure has been adopted. For corporate and labour taxes to be the endoge-
nous variables, we start with the core model of tax competition and then add further variables 
and lags as suggested in Section 2. For corporate taxes, we additionally distinguish between 
the equilibrium specification and the partial adjustment specification. Finally, we present 
some results on the determination of social expenditures. Generally, standard errors of the 
estimated coefficients are given in parentheses. 
4.1  Effects of Globalisation on Corporate Taxation
9 
In Table 1, results for the equilibrium specification of the corporate taxation model are sum-
marised. Most importantly, the degree of integration of the countries in the world economy, 
                                                 
8   To acknowledge the fact that business-cycle effects can dominate the results of estimations when using 
annual data, we alternatively constructed five year time periods from 1967 to 1996. In doing so, we allow 
for flexible time lags between changes in macroeconomic conditions and the adjustment of tax rates. We 
find out that the results for the five-year period data set are very similar to annual time-series data. For 
that reason, we skip the results using five-year period data in the following. 
9   Since we have no effective average corporate tax rates for Austria and Greece, this analysis is only for 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States.   15
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Standard errors in parentheses; 
*, **, *** for significance at the 90, 95, 99% level (two-tailed test) 
 
Table 1  16
measured by open, has a significant negative impact on corporate taxes throughout. This re-
sult is very robust regarding changes of specifications and sample size. Consequently, we are 
able to support the theory of tax competition and the efficiency hypothesis with empirical 
evidence. In equations (1)-(4), the impact of open is implemented without a lag. In (5), open 
is lagged for one period. Then, the effect becomes even more significant. The second element 
of the basic model is the size of the economy. The sign of the variable in the estimated equa-
tions is correct, but the coefficient is never significantly different from zero. A one-period lag 
of the variable in (5) does not alter this finding. Here, the case of the US is especially remark-
able, as this big country has relatively low corporate taxes, which cannot be explained in this 
approach. The impact of the growth variable on taxation is negative, as predicted, and signifi-
cant. The variable for the centre of political gravity, gov, shows a very intuitive result. As the 
value of gov increases from far left to far right, a negative sign means that corporate taxes are 
lower, the more conservative the government and the legislative authorities are. Moreover, in 
this case, the negative sign is very robust and significance is given throughout. The variable 
capital was introduced to supplement the measurement of globalisation with a further proxy. 
However, the variable is not successful in this context. The same applies with the globalisa-
tion measures openness2 and diinvest. Surplus represents the profits of firms. According to 
(4), it emerges that higher profits lead to lower taxation of enterprises, which is plausible 
given the budget constraint requirements. 
Similar results are reported in Table 2 for the partial adjustment specification of the 
corporate tax model. The lagged endogenous variable is highly significant as could be ex-
pected. Moreover, the findings of the equilibrium specification can be sustained. Globalisa-
tion, growth, profits, and the political gravity index still have a negative and significant im-
pact on corporate taxes. The performance of the variable size is not better, however. It is also 
worth noting that the qualitative index capital is now somewhat improved, but still not sig-
nificant. Of course, the inclusion of the lagged endogenous variable improves the overall fit 
decisively. The overall determination coefficient now exceeds 0.7.  17
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(0.21) 
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(0.003) 
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(0.22) 
 


























































































































Standard errors in parentheses; 
*, **, *** for significance at the 90, 95, 99% level (two-tailed test) 
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Endogenous variable: labtax 
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(2.26) 
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(0.001) 
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Standard errors in parentheses; 
*, **, *** for significance at the 90, 95, 99% level (two-tailed test) 
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4.2  Effects of Globalisation on Labour Taxes 
According to the results given in Table 3, globalisation has a very clear and significant impact 
on labour taxes. However, as predicted for the relatively immobile factor by tax competition 
models, the effect is now positive in all estimated equations. Again, the result is robust 
regarding detailed specification and sample size. It is plausible to assume that some credit for 
this outcome can also be attributed to the compensation hypothesis. The sign of size has also 
changed compared to corporate taxes. This shows the requirement of countries to compensate 
increasingly for drops in tax corporate revenues, the smaller the countries are. The impact of 
growth is still negative, as the marginal product of labour and wages also increase after tech-
nical progress, which raises tax revenues ceteris paribus. It is also interesting to see that the 
political variable gov is still negative in sign. This means that the more conservative govern-
ments are, the lower they set labour taxes. However, the effect is not always significant. 
Again, the introduction of one-period lags for open and size does not change the results. 
4.3  Effects of Globalisation on Social Insurance Programmes
10 
Finally, we examine the main statement of the compensation hypothesis. To do so, we have to 
analyse whether international integration leads to increasing social insurance programmes. 
The reason for the supposed changes is that an increased exposure to external risk raises the 
demand for insurance provided by the government. For this, we check the influence of global-
isation, country size, growth, income-level and the rate of unemployment on the endogenous 
variable social expenditure. In this case, we report the result of the feasible generalised least 
squares procedure contained in the stata program. The result of the estimation is given by the 
following equation: 
socexp  =   
 

 80 . 2






























252 . unempl*** (8) 
(Number of observations: 194, Number of countries: 13, R-sq within 0.71, between 0.32, 
overall 0.39) 
As becomes evident from this result, globalisation has a positive and significant impact 
on social expenditures in the OECD countries considered. The outcome thus supports the 
                                                 
10   Due to lack of data this analysis covers only the time period from 1980 to 1995.  20
compensation view of globalisation for this part of government expenditures. As households 
in smaller countries tend to have higher risks when the economy is exposed to the world 
market compared to large economies, it is plausible that the impact of size is negative in this 
case. Again, the impact of growth is negative, meaning that a growing economy is perceived 
as a possible means of compensation on its own. According to the result, the per capita 
income level has no significant influence on social expenditure, while – as could be 
expected  – unemployment is an important factor to determine the level of government 
expenditure. 
5 Conclusions 
Recent empirical studies find a positive impact of globalisation on capital taxes. These results 
contradict the theory of international tax competition, however. The present paper aims to 
clarify some problems of this potential paradox. For a panel of 14 OECD countries in the pe-
riod from 1967 to 1996, we systematically examine the basic results of the tax competition 
literature. The empirical work is based on capital and labour taxation theory, controlling for 
country size effects. The results of the basic theoretical model are obtained with restrictive 
assumptions, which prevent an immediate application to empirical work. Therefore, we add 
further variables to capture the effects of dynamics, uncertainty and political preferences. By 
using effective corporate tax rates for capital taxation, our empirical model examines only a 
sub-group of capital tax competition. However, this procedure is justified as corporate tax-
bases are much closer to the assumption of the theoretical model than other forms of capital 
taxes. 
Our results are as follows. First, we find that national governments lower corporate 
taxes as a consequence of increased globalisation. Thus, in contrast to recent empirical stud-
ies, our empirical results support tax competition theory. The differences between our results 
and the results of recent studies are mainly caused by the use of different variables and model 
specifications. In particular, other measures for corporate taxation and openness have been 
adopted in this paper. These variables explicitly consider tax-base effects and avoid the bias 
of economy size. Second, as theoretical models of tax competition predict for the case of a 
given level of public goods, we find a significantly positive relation between globalisation and 
labour taxation. Third, we observe that governments’ social expenditures are positively re-
lated to increasing globalisation as well. The change in the tax-mix from the rather elastic 
corporate tax-base to the comparatively inelastic labour tax-base supports the efficiency hy-
pothesis of globalisation. On the other hand, the increase in social expenditures supports the  21
compensation hypothesis of globalisation. As a result, the efficiency and the compensation 
hypotheses are both relevant to explain government behaviour, the former for revenues, the 
latter for expenditures.   22
Appendix 
 
variable description  source mean  standard 
deviation 
endogenous          
corptax   effective average corporate 
tax rate 
Genser et al. (2000)  37.25  15.42 
labtax  effective average labour tax 
rate 
Genser et al. (2000)  33.51  9.49 
socexp  Social expenditure as a per-
centage of GDP 
OECD (1998b)  21.95  6.27 
        
exogenous        
growth  growth rate of GDP meas-
ured in PPP-US-dollar 
own calculations  2.98  2.43 
size   relative country size:   
adj. GDP (country) / adj. 
GDP (average) 
own calculations  100  147.99 
votigra  center of political gravity for 
electorate 
Cusack (1997)  3  0.281 
legigra  center of political gravity for 
legislature 
Cusack (1997)  3.03  0.29 
cabigra  center of political gravity 
cabinet 
Cusack (1997)  3.1  0.72 
gov  sum of votigra, legigra and 
cabigra 
own calculations  9.13  1.18 
ilevel  income level: adj. GDP / 
population 
own calculations  14.31  3.77 
openness1  (imports + exports) / GDP  own calculations     
openness2  see page 9   Quinn (1997)  11.23  2.41 
capital  restrictions on payment and 
receipts of capital 
Quinn (1997)  3.14  0.76 
open  residuals from regression of 
size on openness1, see also 
page 10 
own calculations  0  0.22 
diinvest  investment abroad as a share 
of GDP 
own calculations  1.25  1.35 
surplus  operating surplus of corpo-
rate and quasi-corporate 
enterprises as a % of GDP 
own calculations; 
OECD (1998a and 
1999) 
11.01 5.37 
unempl  Rate of unemployment  OECD (1999); Ch.: 
employment / Data-
base: quarterly la-
bour force statistics 
(**2501DSA) 
5.37 3.17 
If not especially indicated, data for calculations are taken from OECD (1999).  23
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